Co-operation and Development (OECD); 3 and (3) the ongoing attempts to develop a similar agreement in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Some light has also now been shed on the vast multitude of bilateral investment treaties (BITs), which mainly affect countries in the developing world. 4 Still largely neglected in academic discussions of investment and environment are unilateral commitments to investment protection made by developing country governments, either through national legislation or contracts with individual investors. 5 These commitments are unilateral in the sense that they are made by a host state without a reciprocal arrangement, be it bilateral or regional, with the investor's home state. Such unilateral commitments may equal, or even surpass, those commitments made in international treaties and may have signi cant implications for the regulation of the environment.
This article aims to assess unilateral commitments to investment protection in developing countries, with a speci c focus on the promise of stability of the domestic legal framework. In order to provide further context for this discussion, a focus is given to one sector in which state contracts 6 and stabilization clauses are particularly prevalent and well advanced-the mineral sector.
Political risk, which is inherent in all investment, is considered to be particularly acute in the mineral sector, and investments in this sector are generally seen as having a greater need for stability than other shorterterm industrial projects. 7 Large-scale mines are viewed as being especially vulnerable because they are capitally intensive investments that cannot be relocated; they use relatively stable production technologies; they produce a homogeneous product with little customer or brand name loyalty; and they operate in an oligopolist industrial structure with limited competitors. 8 Furthermore, investors would argue that, since contracts in this sector are long term in nature, they are susceptible to the 'hostage effect.' 9 As a result of the high degree of political risk that they face, mineral investors have pushed for the development of a 'particularly re ned system of contractual guarantees for the protection of their investments.' 10 At the same time, it is also the case that '[f]ew if any forms of economic development present the array of potential environmental, social and economic problems of the mineral resources industry.' 11 The mining sector provides a good case study for the analysis of the relationship between investment and the environment in view of the environmental, economic, and social importance of the sector in many host countries. 12 This article is structured in the following manner. In section 2, unilateral commitments to investment protection are introduced. In particular, the history and development of state contracts is discussed. Section 3 explains the nature of stabilization clauses and agreements and provides examples from the mineral sector in a number of developing countries. Section 4 examines how commitments to stability might impact the development of environmental policy in developing countries. The article concludes in section 5 with the contention that promises of stability have the potential to restrict the development of environmental policy. Much further research is needed on the environmental policy implications of unilateral commitments to investment protection, in general, and stabilization clauses and agreements, in particular. However, such research will be hampered by the conspicuous absence of transparency in this area.
I I. U N I L AT ER A L C OM M I T M E N T S T O I N V E ST M E N T PRO T E C T ION
In the past two decades, a large number of developing and transition countries have opened their doors to foreign investors, and OECD countries have also deregulated and liberalized their economies. An increase in hospitable investment destinations has led to competition among governments to attract foreign investors. 13 This competition is particularly evident in the mineral sector. Governments respond to these competitive conditions in a number of ways. One way is to offer incentives-scal or otherwise-to attract investors, while another way is to provide investors with certain legal protections. States provide such protection not only through bilateral and regional agreements with other states but also through national legislation and contracts with individual investors. It is the latter two unilateral methods that will be discussed in this article.
National Legislation
Two main types of national legislation are relevant to foreign investment protection: general investment codes and speci c sectoral (in this case, mineral) laws and policies. Only the latter will be examined in this article. In the majority of countries, minerals are owned by the state, and governments employ a variety of mechanisms to vest mining rights to foreign investors. Three distinct eras of mineral laws and policies in developing countries can be distinguished: the pre-1960 (colonial) era; the 1960-85 period; and the post-1985 years. These eras correspond with fundamental political changes and paradigmatic shifts in economic and development theory: '[M]ineral sector policies and laws are neither random nor capricious. Rather, they tend to be rational re ections of the prevailing world view or paradigm.' 14 In the colonial period, there was little need for the development of international law for the protection of foreign investment since, in many cases, the colonial legal systems were integrated into those of the imperial powers, and, in areas that remained uncolonized, the use of 'gun-boat diplomacy' by home states was considered an acceptable means of protecting foreign interests abroad. 15 Following decolonization, many developing countries moved to gain more control over mineral investments, supported by the emerging international norm of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. Numerous investments were nationalized and transferred to newly formed state enterprises. However, the debt crisis, combined with the deterioration in developing countries' terms of trade led to a global movement away from state control of the mineral sector, which began in the late 1970s and gained momentum in the 1980s and 1990s. 16 Structural adjustment programmes, which were developed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, also played an important role in driving this process. Thus, the modern, post-1985 era is marked by a stark shift in attitudes and policy in developing countries and the emergence of a 'contemporary consensus' on the bene ts of foreign investment. 17 As a result, mining investors currently face a large choice of geologically interesting destinations, and, thus, their investment decisions will be based on a number of factors other than merely the availability of resources. 18 In the present paradigm, a country with exploitable mineral resources cannot expect to draw in signi cant investment in the sector if it does not provide a 'friendly' investment climate for mineral investors. 19 As such, and given the current desire among countries to attract investment, it is hardly surprising that around 120 countries reformed their mineral regimes between 1985 and 2002. 20 These reforms were generally aimed at liberalization as well as 'establishing a climate of stability and predictability.' 21 Many mineral laws now provide for investment protection covering expropriation, non-discrimination, and access to international arbitration. However, such protections are limited when they are only enshrined in national laws 'which can be modi ed at will,' 22 which explains why BITs are of increasing importance to investors. Another important avenue by which investors may secure protection is through a contract with the state.
State Contracts
In most developed countries, mining rights are based only on law and regulation. 23 However, developing countries have relied far more on agreements with investors referred to as 'mining agreements' or more generally as 'investment agreements' or 'state contracts.' 24 State contracts in the mineral sector that were drawn up in colonial times are generally referred to as 'concession agreements.' These agreements gave the investors nearly limitless rights over vast areas of land for long periods of time, while imposing few obligations on investors. 25 During this period, mining companies possessed signi cant bargaining power as they had the support of their home states. Following decolonization, the bargaining power shifted to newly independent governments, and many mining contracts were renegotiated or nationalized. 26 The types of investment agreements that were negotiated in this period were very different from traditional concessions. Referred to as 'economic development agreements,' they were far more focused on the goals of the state in promoting development. 27 This generation of contracts took on new forms such as joint venture agreements, production-sharing agreements, service contracts, contracts of work, and management contracts. 28 In the modern period, with the increased competition between states for mineral investment, the bargaining power has arguably begun to shift back to favour mining companies. 29 As a result, the newest generation of mining agreements are mainly concerned with investment promotion and protection. While they still contain some development provisions, they are mainly ones that impose minimal economic cost to investors. 30 Countries may negotiate ad hoc agreements with investors, which will be unique, or provide model agreements to establish the same conditions for several different projects or some hybrid of the two (where model agreements are provided but more speci c terms can be negotiated). 31 As state contracts are generally con dential documents, at least for a given period of time (usually until after the project has terminated), model agreements obviously provide more transparency and opportunity for public scrutiny and thus reduce the possibilities for corruption in the negotiation process. 32 24 UNCTAD, Management of Commodity Resources, supra note 16 at 9; and UNCTAD, Issues in International Investment Agreements, supra note 6 at 3. 25 32 That having been said, one of the most widely recognized examples of a successful model agreement programme is that of the contract-of-work (COW) system in Indonesia, which operated under the new order regime and has been associated with graft.
Mineral agreements rarely endure for fty years or more as was possible in colonial times, but they are still long term in nature. For example, a thirtyyear contract with renewal clauses would not be uncommon. One could argue that the long duration of mineral contracts is justi ed by the high costs and high risks that investors face, however, it should also be recognized that this aspect of contracts may cause problems for the host state, as international and domestic political circumstances, government priorities, and, indeed, governments themselves can change over such periods of time. 33
Changes in the law that may adversely affect an investment are arguably the 'most feared legal risk of mining investors.' 34 Investors employ several methods to mitigate risk. They may attempt to spread the risk through joint nancing, insure against the risk, or they may employ contractual mechanisms. If the investor is seeking to minimize or remove the risk of adverse change in law, then three key (inter-related) contractual mechanisms will be considered. The rst is the choice of law applicable to the contract. Three possible choices of law are possible: the national law of the host state only; international law/general principles of law only; or a combination of national law and international law/general principles of law. 35 In some cases, there is no explicit choice of law clause in the contract, in which case it will be up to the court or tribunal to determine the applicable law.
The second key contractual mechanism is the dispute resolution clause, which indicates where disputes between the parties are to be addressedeither in the national courts of the host country or internationally. If investors are given access to international arbitration, it may be institutional 36 or ad hoc. 37 The third and nal contractual mechanism is the stabilization clause. It is this mechanism that will be the focus of the remainder of this article. However, applicable law and dispute settlement will also be discussed in relation to their effect on the stabilization clause. One of the main dif culties associated with research on stabilization clauses, and investment contracts more generally, is a lack of access to information. Thus, while this section draws on some examples of stabilization clauses and agreements in the mineral sector, it is by no means an exhaustive survey.
The Purpose of Stabilization
The purpose of a stability clause is 'to preserve the law of the host country as it applies to the investment at the time the state contract is concluded' and to ensure 'that the future changes to the law of the host country are inapplicable to the foreign investment contract.' 41 Stability can be said to have both a temporal and an economic dimension:
Stability has a temporal dimension to the extent that it requires the continuity of the contractual relationship towards its successful completion and the achievement of desired objectives as contemplated by the parties. The economic dimension, which is also regarded as the most important indicator of a stable contract order, implies maintaining the contractual equilibrium perceived by the parties throughout the duration of the contract. 42 Notably, stabilization clauses and agreements are found almost exclusively in developing and transition countries. This is for two main reasons. First, the more a government is viewed by foreign investors as being 'volatile and unreliable,' the more the use of stabilization methods will be 'desired and therefore in most cases required by the mining industry.' 43 In general, investors view developing and transition countries as more politically unstable 39 The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) is a private institution, which handles disputes between rms as well as between states and rms. The current Rules of Arbitration of the ICC came into force in 1998 (the rules are available at <www.iccwbo.org/court/english/ arbitration/rules.asp#foreword>).
40 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) was established by the UN General Assembly in 1966 and was given the general mandate to further the progressive harmonization and uni cation of the law of international trade. An integral part of the commission's work is the promotion of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were adopted in 1976 (the rules are available at <www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/ arbitration/1976Arbitration_rules.html>).
41 UNCTAD, Issues in International Investment Agreements, supra note 6 at 26. The stability of the scal regime is generally understood to be the key issue for investors and is the most common area to be stabilized. Stabilization of scal matters could also cover any market-based environmental measures. While the use of measures such as environmental levies and taxes is not yet commonplace in developing countries, there is a global trend towards a greater use of market-based mechanisms, and, thus, it can be expected that developing countries will adopt more of these types of instrument in the future. 49 Clearly, any stabilization of the general legislative framework applicable to the investment will also cover environmental regulation. However, is there evidence that investors are particularly interested in stabilizing environmental requirements? A poll of investors conducted in 1992 suggests that adverse change in law in the area of environmental regulation is a major concern for mineral investors. The 'ability to predetermine environmental obligations' ranked tenth out of sixty possible investment decision criteria in the exploration stage and eighth out of sixty criteria in the mining stage. 50 44 Wälde and N'Di, supra note 7 at 223. 45 It seems fair to assume that a survey today would nd this criterion ranking as high, if not higher. Leading investment law experts have also suggested that after the scal regime, environmental regulations were perhaps the most relevant area in which to seek stability. 51 It is not necessarily the 'strictness' of the environmental regulation in the host country that concerns investors (as the controversial 'pollution haven' hypothesis would suggest) 52 but, rather, the uncertainty regarding future changes to the framework. 53 The existing environmental regulatory framework can be factored into a risk-pro t assessment before the investment is made, whereas future changes cannot. 54 Investors want predictability, and '[e]nvironmental regulation in developing and transition economies is currently one of the most unpredictable factors facing potential investors.' 55 Thus, it is not surprising that, as discussed later in this article, environmental regulations are now also explicitly referred to in some stabilization clauses and agreements.
Methods of Achieving Stabilization
Traditionally, the main method of achieving stability was to insert a stabilization clause into the investment contract. However, in some countries, the national legislation also contains a promise of contractual stability, and, in other cases, contracts are rati ed by the legislature and are, thus, effectively stabilized without the addition of speci c clauses. Finally, more recently, several governments have provided within their mineral or general investment laws the option of negotiating a separate 'stability agreement' or 'legal stability contract.' Each of these options for stabilization will be discussed in turn, with reference to environmentally relevant examples.
A. Promise of Stability in National Legislation
Investment codes and national legislation in developing countries commonly contain provisions for the stability of investment contracts, and some countries even have a stability guarantee included in their constitution. 56 51 Wälde and N'Di, supra note 7 at 230. 52 This hypothesis suggests that investors will be attracted to countries with lower environmental standards, potentially also causing industrial ight from developed (higher standard) countries and a subsequent 'race-to-the-bottom. ' [t]he mining agreement, after its effectiveness, cannot be modi ed but by the written consent of parties. This amendment will be formalised by a rider approved by decree on proposal of the Minister in charge of mines. The mining agreement speci es the obligations and rights of the parties in relation with the legal, nancial, scal, social and environmental conditions applying to exploitation during its term. It guarantees to the mining claim holder the stability of these conditions during the whole term of the claim according to this law provision.
The Mining Act thus commits the government to stabilize all mining agreements, which may also themselves contain stabilization clauses.
B. Stabilization Clause within the Investment Contract
Contractual stabilization clauses 59 were reported to have diminished in scope and frequency in the 1970s, but they now appear to be re-emerging in even more extensive forms than were previously observed. 60 Traditionally, there were three main ways in which stabilization clauses were formulated in investment contracts. 61 The rst option was to prohibit the enactment of any legislation that would adversely affect the investor's rights. This type of clause could even include the prohibition of nationalization. The second type of clause provided that, in the event of an inconsistency between any legislation enacted in the future and the contract, the latter would prevail. This type of clause could also be extended to ensure that any adverse effects of legislation would be avoided, even in the absence of an inconsistency. Finally, the third type of clause incorporated the host country's law and froze it at a speci c date, thus ensuring that legislative changes would not 57 Wälde and N'Di, supra note 7 at 240. 58 Mining Act of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, Law no. 01-10 (2001). 59 It should be noted that there is an important distinction to be made between stabilization clauses and so-called 'intangibility clauses.' In the latter case, administrative interference is removed (that is, the government cannot modify or terminate the contract unilaterally). In the case of the former, it is legislative interference that is controlled. See B. apply to the investment. These three formulations have been collectively referred to as stabilization clauses stricto sensu. 62 Stabilization clauses stricto sensu are still employed in modern agreements, however, new stabilization clauses, which are essentially a hybrid of 'freezing' with re-negotiation, have also emerged. Such clauses aim to restore the economic equilibrium of the contract in the event of legislative change and have thus been termed 'economic stabilization clauses.' 63 The following clause in a Ghanaian mining lease illustrates this concept:
The Parties acknowledge and agree that this Agreement was made on the basis of the laws and conditions prevailing at the date of the effective conclusion of the negotiation of this Agreement and accordingly, if thereafter, new laws and conditions come into existence which unfairly affect the interest of either party to this agreement, then the party so unfairly affected shall be entitled to request a re-negotiation and the parties shall thereupon re-negotiate. The parties hereby undertake and covenant with each other to make every effort to agree, co-operate, and negotiate and to take such action as may be necessary to remove the causes of unfairness or disputes. 64 Since this type of clause does not seek to completely prevent the development or application of new legislation to the investment and favours re-negotiation over arbitration (although arbitration is not precluded if the parties cannot come to an agreement), it is more compatible with the notion of state sovereignty and is likely to be preferable to host governments. 65 However, restoring the economic equilibrium of the contract following a legislative change may still have signi cant implications for the state in terms of compensation or concessions to be made in other areas. Furthermore, determining what the economic impact of the regulation is and, therefore, how the investor should be compensated may be complex, making re-negotiation dif cult.
C. Stabilization of the Entire Investment Contract
The strength of a mineral contract depends both on the type of legal system in the country and the nature of the act approving the agreement. 66 There are three main ways by which mineral contracts are generally approved: by an act of Parliament; by a decree of the executive or the minister responsible for mines; or by the signature of the minister of mines. A mining 62 Faruque, supra note 35 at 319; and Montembault, supra note 59 at 600. 63 Indonesia is an example of a country that passes mineral contracts through Parliament. Mineral investment in Indonesia is organized under a contract-of-work (COW) system. 68 A COW speci es land rents, royalties, and other payments to be made by the investor to the government. In addition, it describes the environmental obligations of the investor, although these are, for the most part, general statements that 'lack the speci city required to allow effective inspection and enforcement of their terms.' 69 Once approved by Parliament, a COW has the status of law in Indonesia 70 and, therefore, 'provides the foreign investor with stable investment conditions since future legislation or changes in Government policy do not affect the COW.' 71 This was a key aspect of a dispute between a number of mining companies and the government of Indonesia following the introduction of a forestry law (Law No. 1999/41) after the fall of the Suharto regime. The law banned open-pit mining in areas that were classi ed as 'protection' forests. However, a large number of investors had COWs covering such areas of forest, and several of them reportedly threatened the Indonesian government with international arbitration and claims of up to US $31 billion in compensation. 72 It is unlikely that the investors would have been able to take a claim very far under a BIT or regional investment agreement, 73 and, therefore, their best recourse would have been to claim breach of contract, based on the argument that COWs are stabilized. This remains only a conjecture, however, as the dispute was never submitted to arbitration. The government of Indonesia agreed to allow a certain number of companies to proceed with their investments, which resolved the con ict. 74 67 Ibid. at 49. 68 At the time of writing, the Indonesian government was in the process of drafting a new mining law, which may radically change, or eliminate entirely, the COW system. 
D. Stability Agreements and Contracts Separate from the Investment Contract
In what appears to be a growing trend, many governments now offer investors the option to negotiate agreements separate from the mineral licence or investment contract, which ensures stability. Variously termed 'stability agreements,' 'development agreements,' or '(legal) stability contracts,' these agreements are referred to in a number of countries' mineral laws. Many of these agreements only stabilize the scal aspects of the investment (that is, taxes and royalties), while others stabilize the entire legal framework or other speci c aspects of it. Several recent laws allow investors to stabilize their environmental commitments through such agreements. For example, in Tanzania, the Mining Act of 1998, which was developed in the context of a World Bank-nanced sectoral reform project, permits the minister of mines to enter into a development agreement with the holder or applicant for a mineral right. According to the act, the development agreement may contain provisions binding on the government, which guarantee the scal stability of a long term mining project, and for that (a) purpose, but not otherwise, make special provision for the payment of royalties, taxes, fees and other scal imposts; relating to the circumstances or the manner in which the Minister or the (b)
Commissioner will exercise any discretion conferred on them by this In 2006 Ghana enacted mining legislation that follows the Tanzanian model quite closely, which is perhaps not surprising as it is widely recognized that the government was revising the law in an attempt to make the country 'more competitive vis-à-vis other regimes such as that adopted by the United Republic of Tanzania' 78 and had also received the advice of the World Bank (as Tanzania had). 79 The main difference with Ghana's law is that the offers to investors are divided into two kinds of agreement: stability agreements and development agreements. These agreements are binding and are subject to international arbitration. A stability agreement ensures that the holder of the mining lease will not, for a period not exceeding fteen years from the date of the agreement, be adversely affected by a new enactment, order instrument or other action made under a new enactment or changes to an enactment, order, instrument that existed at the time of the stability agreement, or other action taken under these that have the effect or purport to have the effect of imposing obligations upon the holder or applicant of the mining lease. 80
According to the minister of lands, forestry, and mines, Dominic Fobih, the 'essence' of this provision is to 'protect the holder of a mining lease for a period not exceeding fteen years from being adversely affected by future changes in laws that result in heavier nancial burdens being imposed on the holder.' 81 In addition to the stability agreement, an investor may also enter into a development agreement if the proposed investment will exceed US $500 million. The Ghana National Coalition on Mining (a group of organizations, communities, and individuals) is not convinced of this argument and strongly opposed the inclusion of stability or development agreements in the new law. 84 The next step for Ghana is to develop a model stability agreement. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has recommended that this model be drafted in close consultation with industry and Parliament and suggests that the stability agreements of Chile and Peru would provide useful models. 85 In Chile, stability contracts include stabilization of the legal, regulatory, and policy regime in addition to scal and other incentives. 86 In Peru, the legal stability agreements are valid for ten years and are offered in a wide variety of sectors with variations in the terms of the agreement by sector. According to an UNCTAD report, the mining, power, hydrocarbon, and infrastructure sectors have the most favourable arrangements. 87 Columbia also provides for legal stability contracts but takes a different approach than Chile or Peru. Direct investments in certain sectors (including mining), which exceed about US $1.2 million, can obtain contractual protection from adverse changes in national legislation. 88 The contract can have a term of three to twenty years, subject to negotiation. While in Chile and Peru, stability agreements can only cover a predetermined list of areas and there is no option for negotiation of the scope of the terms, in Colombia, the government has adopted a positive list approach, which means that they may agree to stabilize any regulation, unless expressly excluded by law. An UNCTAD report rightly points out that this approach will encourage investors to maximize the regulations that will be covered by the contracts. 89 The report also suggests that this approach may foster disputes and that the 'scope for future litigation could be immense. 
The Validity and Effect of Stabilization Clauses and Agreements
There has been a long and divisive debate in academia about the validity of stabilization clauses, which has been largely drawn along ideological lines. While it is certainly important to acknowledge this division, from a practical perspective one must also examine the effect that a stabilization clause or agreement will have if it is deemed to be valid by an arbitral tribunal.
A. Validity
In examining the validity of stabilization techniques, there would appear to be three main positions taken by legal experts: the acceptance of stabilization clauses and contracts as being valid, the dismissal of stabilization clauses as being invalid, and the 'middle ground' view, which accepts the validity of stabilization clauses but denies them full effect (discussed in the following section).
Those that uphold the validity of stabilization clauses, on the one hand, emphasize the principle of sanctity of contract and argue that if a state can bind itself by a treaty with another state, then it may also bind itself by a contract. 91 Furthermore, they claim that the inclusion of certain clauses in a contract (particularly stabilization and arbitration clauses) has the effect of 'internationalizing' the contract. According to this theory, if the contract is internationalized then the obligations within it reside in an external system, which has been called the transnational law of business, general principles of law, or lex mercatoria. 92 Those that deny the validity of stabilization clauses, on the other hand, generally focus on the principle of state sovereignty and the succession of laws principle. 93 They disagree with both the notion that a foreign investment contract can be equated with an inter-state treaty (as foreign investors do not have international legal personality) and the idea that state obligations rest in some 'external' system rather than in national law. It has even been suggested by one author that the theory of internationalization of contracts was only developed in order to give validity to stabilization clauses. 94 Furthermore, in the case of contracts in the natural resource sector, there is perhaps even more reason to doubt the validity of stabilization clauses, 92 UNCTAD, Issues in International Investment Agreements, supra note 6 at 6. 93 The succession of laws principle provides that the 'legislative capacity of lawmakers cannot be bound, nor can the executive/public powers of the government be fettered by a contract with a private individual or corporation, i.e. no parliament can bind its successor through a contractual mechanism.' Otto and Cordes, supra note 8 at IV-22.
94 Sornarajah, supra note 15 at 408. given the importance of the doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. 95 Despite the seemingly intractable academic debate on this issue, tribunals have frequently af rmed the validity of stabilization clauses. 96 Furthermore, notwithstanding the support for the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, states continue to include commitments to stability in their national legislation and their state contracts. Given these realities, the critical issue would appear to be the extent of the effect of a promise of stability.
B. Effect
Most observers now adopt a middle ground on the validity of stabilization clauses, concluding that while they are not completely meaningless they are unlikely to have their intended effect of prohibiting any state interference in an investment. 97 Those adopting this position focus on the effect of the existence of a commitment to stability, which will be determined by several factors. First, the form of the commitment (that is, contractual clause versus national legislation) and its scope (all inclusive versus restricted) will affect the strength of the commitment and determine its application. Second, the applicable law of the contract will have an affect. If the contract is governed by national law, then 'constitutional and legal constraints on the contractual capacity of that state' may limit or negate the effect of a stabilization clause, whereas if international law was chosen as the applicable law of the contract 'the stability of the contract would appear to be enhanced.' 98 However, even when international law is the applicable law, it will not provide a complete guarantee of contractual stability since it is recognized in international law that the state has the right to interfere in a contract when its vital interests are at stake. 99 If a tribunal nds that a government has breached a promise of stability, what is the likely consequence? The most accepted argument appears to be that while stabilization clauses cannot stop a government from 'doing what it pleases,' the investor will be entitled to 'comprehensive compensation' 95 Ibid. 96 97 Much of the discussion on the effect of stabilization clauses has focused on the issue of whether they make nationalization unlawful. This issue will not be discussed in depth in this article since my primary interest is in legislative change or government interference in a contract rather than all-out nationalization. For an overview of arbitration cases dealing with the issue of nationalization and stabilization, see T. Begic, Applicable Law in International Investment Disputes (2005) . 98 Faruque, supra note 35 at 333-4. 99 Ibid.
in the instance of a breach. 100 Paul E. Comeaux and N. Stephan Kinsella similarly suggest that,
[g]enerally, arbitrators will not order speci c performance of a concession agreement, even if it contains a stabilization clause, out of respect for state sovereignty and an inability to enforce such an award . . . Instead a state's violation of a stabilization clause is more likely to affect the amount of damages awarded or the certainty that damages will be awarded. 101 The affect of commitment to stability on the amount of damages awarded in the case of a breach has been referred to as a 'stabilization premium,' the amount of which should be determined based on the 'legal weight of the stabilization promise.' 102 In addition to increasing the likelihood of receiving compensation, and, potentially, the amount of compensation, several authors also suggest that there is a functional value to stabilization clauses since they can act as a 'bargaining chip' for investors in any re-negotiation of the terms of the contract. 103 There is also a potential 'deterrent effect' of the stabilization clause, which means that governments will be discouraged from breaching these clauses as it would 'undermine the host government's credibility to undertake contractual commitments' and could lead to arbitration before an international tribunal, which 'obviously has a negative impact on the host state's reputation, and may entail huge costs.' 104
The key problem with state contracts, and investment law in general, is the need to balance the legitimate need of the investor for stability with the legitimate need of the regulator for exibility to respond to changing values, risks, and circumstances. This is the main theme of the recent discussions of 'policy space,' which have largely focused on development policy but are equally applicable to environmental policy. Policy space was the focus of the World Investment Report 2003, in which it was argued that for developing countries the most important future challenge in international investment agreements is to 'strike a balance' between trying to increase investment ows through investor protection and trying to preserve policy space, noting that while '[t]oo much policy space impairs the value of international obligations,' conversely, '[t]oo stringent obligations overly constrain national policy space.' 105 The report went on to note that the 'foundation' of national policy space is the 'right to regulate, a sovereign prerogative that arises out of a State's control over its own territory and that is a fundamental element in the international legal regime of State sovereignty.' 106 In addition, the South Centre has argued that the concept also composes the principles of the right to development and to special and differential treatment for developing countries. 107 In 2004 the issue of policy space received even more prominence at the eleventh UNCTAD conference, where the São Paulo Consensus was adopted, which recognized that [i] t is for each Government to evaluate the trade-off between the bene ts of accepting international rules and commitments and the constraints posed by the loss of policy space. It is particularly important for developing countries, bearing in mind development goals and objectives, that all countries take into account the need for appropriate balance between national policy space and international disciplines and commitments. 108 The need for exibility or policy space may be particularly acute in the area of environmental policy making. As Konrad von Moltke reasons,
[e]nvironmental management is a dynamic activity, responding to growing knowledge concerning the environment and anthropogenic threats to it, as well as to changing perceptions concerning the seriousness of these threats . . . An added level of complexity derives from the continuous development of technologies designed to protect the environment. As these technologies become available, policy must adjust to re ect new capabilities. 109 Governments are pressured both from below (from their citizens) and from above (from international treaties and the international community) to respond to environmental problems, and 'the presumption of sovereign discretion in this area is likely to be even stronger than that applied to scal regimes.' 110 However, especially in developing countries, it is also clear that the pace of development of new environmental legislation is much slower than the adoption of new policies and laws that aim to liberalize and protect foreign investment. 111 In the case of the mineral sector, environmental legislation in developing countries is a relatively recent phenomenon, 112 and governments often lack the relevant tools and manpower to properly enforce the environmental regulations that are in place. 113 Furthermore, there is no comprehensive international agreement on mining. 114 The question then becomes what impact foreign investment protection, in this case the promise of stability, might have on the development of domestic environmental policy and, by extension, on the implementation of any relevant international environmental agreements that may be developed in the future.
1. The Impact of Stability on Environmental Policy Development: Three Scenarios Three scenarios are possible for the overall impact of stability commitments on the development of environmental policy. The rst is that the promise of stability may have no, or negligible, impact. This scenario is possible if the government was, in any case, not interested in, or capable of, improving environmental standards for the project or sector that is covered by a commitment to stability over the period of stabilization. This is more likely to occur if the period of stabilization is very short. It is also possible if the government actually does raise standards, but the investor chooses not to enforce its rights. Some authors suggest that it is very dif cult 'in the current climate' for investors to 'rely on legal safeguards negotiated in the past to fend off demands for improved environmental protection, especially if subsequent environmental regulation does nothing but adopt current international practices.' 115 A second possibility is that stabilization clauses could have a positive impact on the development of environmental policy. This scenario is not likely with the type of stabilization clauses discussed in this article (unless environmental standards in the country were lowered over time). However, there is the potential for investment agreements to take on broader policy initiatives aimed at sustainable development. 116 If investors are really only concerned with the predictability of legislation, and not with the strictness of it, then they could conceivably agree to stabilize their environmental commitments at a higher standard (for example, international best practice) from the beginning of the contract. Governments could also attach comprehensive environmental management plans to state contracts, outlining the measures that the government intends to pursue in a given period of time, thus allowing investors to plan and assess their costs and risks for at least this period. 117 The nal possibility is that stabilization clauses and agreements could have a negative impact on environmental policy development. Developing countries with scarce resources are unlikely to have the funds available to compensate investors for disruptions to the economic equilibrium of state contracts. If a government changes the environmental regulatory framework of an investment, despite the existence of a stabilization clause and without offering satisfactory compensation, then the con ict could be elevated to formal dispute settlement. The issue of how an international arbitral tribunal might deal with such a dispute is covered quite extensively in the article by Lorenzo Cotula elsewhere in this volume. 118 Thus, instead of delving into the case law on stabilization, the next section will examine the negative impacts that stabilization clauses and agreements can have on environmental policy development in the absence of a formal dispute.
Negative Impacts of Stability in the Absence of a Formal Dispute
While most research on the relationship between investment law and environmental law and policy focuses on disputes that are resolved in international arbitration, many con icts between investors and states will likely never reach this stage. Arbitration is a high-risk, high-cost option for both governments and investors. 119 Furthermore, states are concerned with the effect that formal disputes may have on their reputation as investor-friendly hosts. Although formal dispute settlement is certainly not a desirable outcome, it does at least indicate a willingness on the part of a government to defend the regulation in question. Furthermore, while the concern over tribunal decisions made in several investment-environment cases is merited, given the weak bargaining position of many states, negotiated outcomes may be just as bad, or worse, from an environmental policy perspective.
In this section, it will be argued that, even in the absence of a formal dispute, the promise of stability may slow or stall environmental policy development (the maintenance of the status quo); reduce the coherence, effectiveness, or ef ciency of policies that are developed; and lead to a loss of democratic accountability in the policy development process.
A. Maintenance of the Status Quo
The ultimate aim of stability is the maintenance of the status quo. It is generally unlikely that stabilization clauses or agreements would result in 'regulatory rollback,' 120 although the Tanzanian mining law described earlier does cause some concern in this respect. 121 However, the maintenance of the status quo in environmental policy is by no means a desirable outcome, particularly in the developing world: 'If the status quo is as stringent as environmental regulations are going to get, then the effect will be an entrenchment of poor quality regulations, and the entrenchment of differences in the stringency of those regulations between rich and poor countries.' 122 This entrenchment has been alternatively described as the 'stuck at the bottom' effect 123 or the 'stuck in the mud' phenomenon. 124 The theory of 'regulatory chill' (which rst emerged in the context of the 'pollution haven' debate) 125 would suggest that regulators fear raising environmental standards beyond the status quo because they believe it might deter new investment or cause industrial ight. 126 The existence of stabilization clauses and agreements adds a new dimension to this theory since governments also fear breaching contractual commitments. This is the 'deterrent effect' of stabilization clauses, which is mentioned earlier. Governments are deterred, rst of all, because a breach of a stabilization clause might have a negative effect on their reputation among foreign investors:
The host State's compliance with contractual commitments can increase its reputation as a credible and reliable partner in long term investment. On the other hand, a breach of contractual commitment may bring a reputational cost for the host state in future dealings, not only with companies aggrieved by a breach of promise but also in dealings with all other companies that are aware of the breach. 127 In addition, a government might fear breaching a contract if the investor threatens to utilize its access to international arbitration. Several observers have expressed concern that arbitration may be used as 'an offensive weapon to harass or intimidate.' 128 Although threats of investment arbitration have occurred in developed states such as Canada, 129 such threats are likely to be a much greater problem in developing countries since ' [t] here is, of course, bound to be an inverse relationship between the degree of experience and human and nancial resources available [in the host country], on the one hand, and the [host state's] willingness to engage in litigation, on the other.' 130 This deterrent effect, which leads to regulatory chill, may very well be a major reason why investors seek promises of stabilization. It is an open question whether 'foreign investors really believe or reasonably expect that regulatory regimes will not be modi ed over time' or, instead, whether perhaps they 'reasonably anticipate changes and only hope for few or minor changes-the chilling effect motivation?' 131 On the other end of the spectrum, governments arguably might use the existence of contractual commitments as an excuse to maintain the status quo in environmental policy. The idea of 'political cover' can be understood as a means for a government to avoid domestic backlash for a failure to act or for an unpopular policy decision by using an 'our hands are tied' argument. 132 The existence of a stability promise in a state contract with binding arbitration clauses could be used quite effectively in this way, particularly if a previous government was responsible for the negotiation and signing of the contract.
Discerning when a government is being genuinely constrained by a contractual commitment (regulatory chill) and when it is, instead, using this commitment as a convenient defence for a politically unpalatable position (political cover) is dif cult in practice. For example, in the Indonesian case mentioned earlier, 133 one could interpret the government decision to allow open-pit mining to proceed in protected forests, despite the ban on such activities, as either evidence that the threat of arbitration has induced a regulatory chill or that the contractual commitments and the threat of arbitration have been used as political cover, de ecting some of the political backlash that nevertheless ensued. In either case, the end result remains negative from the perspective of environmental policy development.
Finally, it is also important to consider the internal political struggles within a government. Promises of stability are not likely to be negotiated by the ministries/agencies that make the social and environmental policies that are affected by them. While environmental ministries/agencies may seek to be progressive in policy development, it may be in the interests of the ministries that negotiate state contracts (mining, economic, foreign, and so on) to ensure the maintenance of the status quo. Ministries involved in investment and economic development are likely to hold a stronger position in the government hierarchy than environmental ones, and the development of binding stabilization clauses may serve to reinforce or even exacerbate these power structures. 134
B. Reduced Policy Coherence, Effectiveness, and Ef ciency
One could argue in opposition to the earlier discussion on the maintenance of the status quo that stabilization clauses are only applicable to individual projects for limited periods of time and therefore do not cause a general 'chill' in environmental regulation. However, the limited nature of stabilization clauses actually creates further problems in terms of policy coherence. If each investment contract freezes the environmental legislation for one project at a given time, then it is possible for different projects in the same sector to be governed by completely different sets of rules. Furthermore, domestic investors are unlikely to be offered the stability that covers foreign investments and will therefore also be covered by a separate set of rules:
Stabilization clauses that attempt to immunize the contract from normal operation of the succession of laws principle raise serious practical and legal problems for host countries. If this limit on legislative discretion is effectively secured, ten or even thirty years later the project may operate under a legal regime very different from that governing all other economic activities. Moreover, different mining projects may operate under different investment terms. From political, economic, administrative and legal perspectives the acceptability of this result is problematic. The concern is likely to be even greater when contracts freeze preferential terms not available to local investors. This would reintroduce a new form of legal and economic enclave and the dangers envisaged by bargaining theorists. 135 In terms of environmental management, this kind of regulatory incoherence would result in an increased strain on the already limited resources that developing countries have to devote to monitoring and enforcement activities.
In addition to being con ned to speci c projects for set periods of time, stability may also be restricted to only certain types of legislation. While the regulatory chill hypothesis suggests that environmental policy development may slow down or stall, if a stabilization clause is restricted in its application the potential impact may be subtler, affecting only the options available to governments in the development of policy. In other words, stabilization clauses and agreements may limit the number of tools in the 'policy toolbox.' For example, as already mentioned, stability of the scal regime might preclude the use of a market mechanism to tackle environmental pollution:
A particular feature of those environmental levies and charges is that they are changed regularly, adapting to constantly changing environmental and economic conditions. Hence, a con ict between domestic environmental tax regimes and investment stability will predictably emerge in those countries pursuing sustainable policies. 136 If stabilization clauses limit the range of instruments available to regulators, then this may in turn result in a reduction of the effectiveness or ef ciency of the policies produced.
C. Loss of Democratic Accountability
Transparency, access to information, and public participation are important elements of both the concept of sustainable development and the 'good governance' agenda. 137 Ironically, while transparency (on the part of governments) is also touted as a key ingredient of a 'friendly' investment climate, the negotiation of state contracts with investors remains a remarkably secretive affair in most countries. In many cases, contracts are negotiated and signed without the involvement of Parliament or the disclosure of the agreement to the public. Where Parliaments are involved in the process, it is often a matter of 'rubber-stamping' rather than genuine participation. 138 In addition to being negotiated in fundamentally undemocratic ways, state contracts also give governments a way to avoid political backlash to unpopular decisions. The ability of governments to utilize the contractual commitments as political cover, which is enhanced when the details of contractual commitments are not publicly disclosed from the outset, arguably reduces the democratic accountability of government decisions. It can be concluded, therefore, that the inclusion of stabilization clauses in contracts that are not transparent leads to a loss of democratic accountability in the environmental policy-making process:
Without public scrutiny of foreign investment contracts, it is impossible for citizens to judge whether or not their elected governments are acting in their best interests and effectively pursuing or meeting public policy goals. It is also impossible for them properly to hold their governments to account for consequences of foreign direct investment. 139
Inter-state investment agreements are public documents, and, increasingly, international arbitration institutions are acknowledging the necessity of transparency in investor-state proceedings. Arguably, the public interest in state contracts is as high, if not higher, than in inter-state agreements and investor-state disputes. While, in recent years, there have been several international efforts aimed at increasing transparency in the natural resources sector (for example, Publish What You Pay and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative), the focus has primarily been on the issue of royalties and the management of public revenues derived from the sector rather than on the overall transparency of contractual commitments made by governments. 140
V. C ONC LUSIONS A N D R E C OM M E N DAT IONS
In this article it has been argued that unilateral commitments to investment protection may equal, or even surpass, those commitments made in international treaties, which have as of late been put in the spotlight. In particular, it focused on the promise of stability in the domestic legal framework. Through a survey of recent mineral laws and contracts, it has been demonstrated that, increasingly, developing countries are providing general and speci c commitments to stability, which cover environmental regulation.
138 IIED brie ng paper, supra note 5 at 3. 139 Ibid. The validity and effect of these commitments continue to be debated, but a consensus appears to have formed on the requirement for comprehensive compensation in the event of a breach. There is the potential for commitments to stability, if properly formulated, to have negligible, or even positive, impacts on environmental policy development. However, the clauses and agreements reviewed in this article indicate that many existing commitments are instead likely to be restrictive. Whether stabilization clauses and agreements result in regulatory chill, are used as political cover, or reduce policy coherence, ef ciency, and effectiveness, they are likely to have signi cant negative implications for the evolution of environmental policy in developing countries. Furthermore, commitments to stability, which are often unknown to the general public due to the lack of transparency in the negotiation of state contracts, can reduce democratic accountability in the environmental policy-making process.
Con icts over contractual breaches may damage a host country's reputation for investor 'friendliness' and can also result in costly investor-state disputes, which developing countries can ill afford. It would appear, then, that developing countries are 'caught between a rock and a hard place.' On the one hand, through the progressive development of international environmental law and through development assistance projects, they are being asked to 'catch up' with the environmental standards of the developed world. On the other hand, they are expected to be 'stable' and 'predictable' in order to attract much-needed foreign investment in the face of ever-increasing environmental awareness and continuously evolving technologies.
Given the fact that in many developing countries environmental regulation of foreign investment is minimal to begin with, agreeing to general or speci c commitments to stability of the environmental regulatory framework could lock the country into deteriorating environmental conditions. If a developing country is determined to adopt stability commitments, then it should, at the very least, frame the clause or agreement in such a way as to favour renegotiation rather than arbitration. Furthermore, it would be more sensible to stabilize environmental commitments for investors at stricter (international best practice) standards than to stabilize more lenient domestic standards.
Stabilization clauses and agreements covering environmental requirements constitute an emerging and complex issue in international investment law, which to date has largely escaped scrutiny. Many of the developments in this area are very recent and their direction and implications are vastly under researched. This article has been a rst attempt to shed some light on the 'state of the art' in this emerging area of investment law in at least one environmentally sensitive sector. Further research is required on commitments to stability, particularly in other environmentally relevant sectors. Unfortunately, such research will be greatly complicated by the lack of access to information concerning state contracts. The con dentiality of state contracts is not justi able, and greater transparency and public debate over stabilization commitments should be considered a part of the broader push for greater public transparency, democracy, and good governance.
